Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence? by Thompson, William C.





The issue of jury competence has arisen due to concerns about the ability
of jurors to deal appropriately with the increasing complexity of evidence
presented in trials. While most attention has focused on complex civil
litigation,' criminal trials have grown more complex as well, due in part to
revolutionary advances in the forensic sciences.2 New procedures for criminal
identification, such as protein gel electrophoresis, DNA typing, gas
chromotography, and neutron activation analysis have recently become
available for use at trial.3 Additionally, the technology behind many of the
more traditional identification techniques, such as bite mark comparison and
hair comparison, has advanced in recent years.4 For a juror to understand
and evaluate the technology underlying these techniques is often a formidable
task in itself.
Adding further to the difficulty is the probabilistic nature of much of this
new evidence. The results of forensic tests are often meaningful only if they
are accompanied by statistical data. For example, evidence that the defendant
in a rape case has genetic markers matching those in semen recovered from a
rape victim cannot be evaluated without statistical information on the
frequency of the matching markers in the population. Because forensic tests
are often less than perfectly reliable, statistical data on the error rate of the
test may be necessary as well. 5 Hence, jurors may hear that a criminalist
compared a sample of the defendant's blood to a semen sample taken from
the rape victim using a procedure known as protein gel electrophoresis and
found that the two samples contain a common set of genetic markers that
collectively occur in only 1.5 percent of the population. The jurors may also
hear, however, that proficiency tests have found that criminalists misclassify
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genetic markers in blood in semen at rates ranging from 1 to 6 percent per
marker. What should jurors make of such evidence? What do they make of it?
The use of such statistical data in court is growing rapidly. 6 According to
one authority, "our criminal justice system is now at the threshold of an
explosion in the presentation of mathematical testimony."'7 The complexity
of such testimony has raised concerns about the ability of jurors to deal with
such evidence appropriately. 8 Empirical studies of the ability of lay
individuals to use the type of statistical evidence presented in criminal trials
have emerged only recently.9 While this new literature is small and full of
gaps, it is beginning to define the strengths and weaknesses of statistical
reasoning by laypersons in ways that should prove quite helpful to courts
facing decisions about the admissibility of statistical evidence and about the
manner in which statistics should be presented to the jury.
II
THE NATURE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
A discussion of jurors' competence to evaluate statistical evidence must
necessarily begin with a description of the statistics jurors may encounter in a
criminal trial and with a discussion of how jurors should evaluate those
statistics.io There are two basic types of statistics: base rates and error rates.
A base rate measures the frequency at which an event or characteristic occurs
in a population." l An error rate measures the frequency at which a test or
procedure produces wrong results. Although an error rate is a type of base
rate, error rate statistics raise special issues distinct from those surrounding
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Blood is Their Argument: Probabilities in Criminal Cases, Genetic Viarkers, and Once Again, Bayes' Theorem, U.
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9. See, e.g., J. GOODMAN, PROBABILISTIC SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: JURORS' INFERENCES (1988);
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other statistics on the frequency of events. Accordingly, base rates and error
rates will be discussed separately.
A. Base Rates
Base rate statistics are usually developed from empirical studies in which a
population, or a sample drawn from the population, is surveyed to determine
the frequency of the event or attribute. For example, a survey showing 40
percent of a sample of Caucasians have type A blood establishes a base rate of
type A blood among Caucasians. A study showing that 15 percent of the
taxicabs in a city are green establishes a base rate of green cabs in the city. A
study showing that 90 percent of defendants tried for burglary are convicted
establishes a base rate of convictions among burglary defendants. The base
rate of an event or attribute is equal to the probability that it will be present in
a randomly selected member of the relevant population.' 2
1. Directly Relevant and Indirectly Relevant Base Rates. Base rate statistics can
be used to prove a fact in two distinct ways. In some instances, the base rate is
directly relevant to a target outcome because it directly expresses the
frequency of that outcome. When a pedestrian is struck by a bus of unknown
origin, evidence that a particular company operated 90 percent of the buses
on that route is directly relevant to the question of who owned the bus.
Similarly, when a defendant possessing heroin has been charged with
concealing an illegally imported narcotic, evidence that 98 percent of all
heroin is illegally imported is directly relevant to the question of whether the
heroin possessed by the defendant was illegally imported. In such instances,
the base rate is said to establish a prior probability of the target outcome.13 If
90 percent of the buses that could have been involved in the accident are
owned by a particular company, then there is a prior probability of .90 that
that company owned the offending bus.
In other instances, the base rate is only indirectly relevant to a target
outcome, and must be combined with other information before any
probabilistic assessment of the target outcome is possible. When forensic
tests link a criminal defendant to a crime by showing his blood type matches
that of the perpetrator, evidence that the blood type is found in 5 percent of
the population is relevant to the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt, but
only indirectly. The base rate of the blood type does not, by itself, reveal
anything about the likelihood of the target outcome-the defendant's guilt-
and thus, unlike a directly relevant base rate, does not establish a prior
probability of the target outcome. Instead, it speaks to the likelihood the
defendant might, by chance, have a "matching" blood type if innocent, and
thus helps to establish the value of the forensic evidence.
12. Id.
13. The prior probability of a target outcome is the probability a reasonable person would
assign to that outcome prior to receiving any case-specific or individuating information.
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The use of "directly relevant" base rates as evidence in court has been
controversial, particularly where the base rate is the sole evidence of a target
outcome. Base rates of this sort have been labeled "naked statistical
evidence"' 14 and have generally been held inadmissible.' 5 A few courts,
however, have admitted such evidence. 16 The most widely discussed case
involving "naked statistical evidence" is Smith v. Rapid Transit, '7 in which
plaintiff was struck by a hit-and-run bus and based her claim that the bus was
the defendant's solely on evidence that the defendant operated 90 percent of
the buses in the city. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained
defendant's motion for summary judgment on grounds that the base rate
statistic was insufficient to make a case against the defendant in the absence of
more particularized proof of the ownership of the offending bus.
While most commentators agree with this holding, they disagree on the
rationale. One group, which has been labeled "anti-Bayesian,"' 8 argues that
base rates are inherently inferior to more particularized evidence and have
little or no relevance unless they reflect a "suitably narrowed down reference
class."' 19 By this account, the frequency of defendant's buses among all buses
in the city is merely "background information" that does not necessarily
reflect the likelihood that the hit-and-run bus was defendant's, and therefore
is an insufficient basis for a holding in plaintiff's favor.20  Other
commentators, sometimes labeled Bayesians, maintain that base rates need
not meet any standard of specificity in order to be relevant.2' By their
account, the fact that defendant operates 90 percent of the buses in the city is
highly relevant because it establishes a prior probability of .90 that the
offending bus was defendant's. This estimate is subject to modification in
light of additional evidence, of course; but the most accurate estimate one can
make of the likelihood the bus was the defendant's, in the absence of other
evidence, is .90. While many commentators in the Bayesian camp agree with
the holding in Smith, they do so on grounds of policy considerations unrelated
to doubts about the evidentiary value of base rates. 22
14. Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard. Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence
and Multiple Causation, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 488 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit, 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).
16. E.g., Turner v. U.S., 396 U.S. 398, 414-16, reh 'g denied, 397 U.S. 958 (1970); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
17. 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).
18. See Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 11.
19. Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627, 633. See
also Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116
(1978).
20. Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 11, offer a cogent critique of the anti-Bayesian position.
21. "From the perspective of verdict accuracy, it is unjustifiable to ignore, by reason of its
unspecificity, the best available base rates." Id.
22. For example, they fear that allowing a party to prevail based solely on "naked statistical
evidence" may lead to strategic behavior, in which case-specific evidence is suppressed by the party
favored by the base rate, and other "feedback effects" involving opportunistic responses to the
knowledge that such evidence will be used. These concerns would generally not apply where base
rates are offered in conjunction with more particularized evidence; hence most of these
commentators argue that "directly relevant" base rates should be admitted where they are not
"naked." But even "non-naked" base rates are sometimes excludable on policy grounds. For
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The use in trials of "indirectly relevant" base rates has been more
common. Base rates of this type may be used to show the weight that should
be accorded a piece of forensic evidence. For example, where the perpetrator
and the defendant are shown to have the same blood type, the prosecutor
often presents statistics on the frequency of that blood type in a relevant
population to prove that the match is unlikely to have occurred by chance. 23
Statistics on the percentage of the population possessing a given blood group
are routinely admitted in evidence in most states. 24 Statistics also have been
admitted in conjunction with forensic evidence showing a match between
samples of hair, 25 glass and paint,2 6 fibers, 27 particles,2 8 and teeth marks. 29
2. Sources of Base Rate Statistics. Because the value of associative evidence
depends, in part, on the rarity of the characteristic or trace that links the
defendant to the crime, forensic scientists have devoted much effort in recent
years to studying the rarity of characteristics likely to be important in criminal
identification. Efforts are being made in the United States and the United
Kingdom to collect and store frequency data in a central location.30 Base rate
statistics literature is increasingly finding its way into criminal trials.3 '
The studies in this area are of two types. One type of study simply reports
the relative frequency of various characteristics or traces in a sample drawn
from some population. Most studies on the frequency of serological
example, it would be inconsistent with the constitutionally based presumption of innocence for a
prosecutor to present base rate evidence showing that a high percentage of defendants in similar
cases are convicted in order to show that a particular defendant is likely to be guilty.
23. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 605-31; N. Miller, supra note 10.
24. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 589-92, 605-38; Jonakait, supra note 6, at
639; Annotation, Admissibility, WIeight and Sufficiency of Blood Grouping Tests in Criminal Cases, 2 A.L.R. 4th
500 (1980). The major exception, for a number of years, was New York, where in 1970 the state's
highest appellate court found error in the admission of evidence that a defendant and perpetrator
shared a blood type (Type A) found in 40% of the population. People v. Robinson, 27 N.Y.2d 864,
265 N.E.2d 543, 317 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1970); accord People v. Macedonio, 42 N.Y.2d 944, 366 N.E.2d
1355, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1977). The Robinson court found that this evidence was "of no probative
value in the case against defendant in view of the large proportion of the general population having
blood of this type" and expressed concern that jurors might give such evidence more weight than it
deserves. 27 N.Y.2d at 865, 265 N.E.2d at 543, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 20. The court subsequently
admitted evidence of a match on a set of blood group markers found in 1% of the population,
however, arguing that "the relative rarity of the . . . type of blood relegates arguments as to
remoteness to the realm of weight rather than admissibility." In re Abe A, 56 N.Y.2d 288, 299, 437
N.E.2d 265, 271, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 12 (1982). Then, in 1985, the court disavowed Robinson, citing
near unanimous opposition to the holding by commentators, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205, at
619 (3d ed. 1984), and other courts, and recognizing that while proof of a match on a common
characteristic has little value by itself, such evidence "may acquire great probative value when
considered cumulatively." People v. Mountain, 66 N.Y.2d 197, 203, 486 N.E.2d 802, 805, 495
N.Y.S.2d 944, 947-48 (1985).
25. E.g., United States ex ret. DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1982).
26. State v. Menard, 331 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1960).
27. People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 105, 194 P.2d 681 (1948).
28. People v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'don other grounds, 403 U.S. 443,
rehg denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
29. State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 (1978).
30. Saferstein, Criminalistics-A Look Back at the 1970s, A Look Ahead to the 1980s, 24 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 925 (1979).
31. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 423-504, 605-31.
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characteristics are of this type. 32 Studies have also been undertaken to
determine the frequency of various types of paint, 33 glass, 3 4 fibers, 35 and
soil;36 the frequency of wear characteristics in men's footwear; and the
frequency with which blood and semen stains3 7 and glass and paint particles38
are found on outer clothing and shoes.
A second type of study looks directly at the likelihood of a coincidental
match between samples rather than the proportion of various characteristics
in the population. Two Canadian forensic scientists, for example, conducted
a study in which thousands of hairs from 100 unrelated individuals were
compared under a microscope with respect to twenty-three different
characteristics, such as color, pigment distribution, diameter, and scale count.
In approximately one of every 4500 comparisons of hairs from different
individuals, a match was found with respect to all twenty-three characteristics.
Hence, the researchers reported that the chances of a coincidental match
between two unrelated individuals on a microscopic comparison of scalp hairs
is one in 4500. 39 Based on a subsequent study, the probability of a
coincidental match for pubic hairs was estimated to be one in 800.40 Data on
the probability of coincidental match have also been collected on dental
characteristics, DNA print patterns, 4 1 and even lipstick-the finding that there
32. E.g., Grunbaum, Selvin, Myhre & Pace, Distribution of Gene Frequencies and Discrimination
Probabilities of 22 Human Blood Genetic Systems in Four Racial Groups, 25 J. FORENSIC Sci. 428 (1980);
Steadman, Blood Group Frequencies of Immigrant and Indigenous Populations for South East England, 25 J.
FORENSIC SCi. Soc'y 95 (1985).
33. Ryland, Kipec & Somerville, The Evidential Value of Automobile Paint, Part 11: Frequency of
Occurrence of Topcoat Color, 26J. FORENSIC Sci. 64 (1981).
34. Fong, Value of Glass as Evidence, 18J. FORENSIC Sci. 398 (1973).
35. Home & Dudley, A Summary of Data Obtained From a Collection of Fibres From Casework Materials,
20J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'y 253 (1980).
36. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 1080-86.
37. Owen & Smalldon, Blood and Semen Stains on Outer Clothing and Shoes Not Related to Crime:
Report of a Survey Using Presumptive Tests, 20J. FORENSIC Sci. 391 (1975).
38. Pearson, May & Dabbs, Glass and Paint Fragments Found in Men's Outer Clothing-Report of a
Survey, 16J. FORENSIC Sci. 283 (1971).
39. Gaudette & Keeping, An Attempt at Determining Probabilities in Human Scalp Hair Comparison, 19
J. FORENSIC SCi. 599, 604 (1974). This study has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Barnett & Ogle,
Probabilities and Human Hair Comparison, 27J. FORENSIC SCi. 272 (1982); Note, Splitting Hairs in Criminal
Trials: Admissibility of Hair Comparison Probability Estimates, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 521.
40. Gaudette, Probabilities and Human Pubic Hair Comparisons, 21 J. FORENSIC Sci. 514, 517 (1976).
41. DNA typing procedures produce "prints" consisting of a pattern of bands somewhat
analogous to a supermarket bar code. See generally Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Admissibility and
Weight of the .Vew Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989). Individuals differ in the position
of the bands on their print. To determine the likelihood of a coincidental match between DNA prints
of two unrelated individuals, where the prints in question had fifteen distinct bands, Jeffreys, Wilson,
and Them made prints of twenty unrelated individuals, laid the prints side-by-side, and counted the
number of instances in which a band in one print was matched by a band in the adjacent print.
Jeffreys, Wilson & Them, Individual-specific "Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985).
Overall, about 21 % of the bands were matched by a band on an adjacent print. Accordingly, Jeffreys
and colleagues concluded that there is about a 21% chance that a given band in a DNA print will be
matched by a band in the print of an unrelated individual. To calculate the probability that two
unrelated individuals will match on all fifteen bands, the researchers applied the product rule and
concluded that the probability of a coincidental match on fifteen bands is approximately 0.21 ' or
one in thirty billion.
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was a one-in-707 chance that samples of lipstick chosen at random would
match Was reportedly used as evidence in two criminal cases. 42
3. Drawing Conclusions from Base Rate Statistics: Potential Problems and
Complexities. Although base rate statistics are often highly relevant and
informative, their probative value depends on a number of factors. To deal
competently with base rate statistics, jurors must take these factors into
account. However, several potential problems with base rate statistics may
make these statistics misleading if jurors fail to understand their defects.
One problem is that base rates may be derived from inaccurate or
uninformative data. For example, regional or geographic variations in the
frequency of various types of fibers, paints, or soil types may render data
based on samples in one area unrepresentative of frequencies in other areas.
Kaye notes that for blood typing "the sampling is sufficiently extensive and
variegated that the statistic should be reliable" while for other types of
forensic evidence "scientific knowledge of the population parameter usually is
* . more sketchy." 43 Kaye favors admitting into evidence even these
"sketchy" statistics on the grounds that they "can provide some clue as to the
frequency of trace evidence in the population at large." 44  To draw
appropriate conclusions from such statistics, however, jurors must appreciate
the implications of sampling variability and sample bias. Research on the
judgmental ability of untrained individuals raises some doubts about jurors'
competence in this area. 4 5
A second potential problem concerns computing the frequency of the joint
occurrence of multiple characteristics. Where forensic evidence shows a
match on several characteristics-for example, three distinct genetic markers
in blood-forensic experts typically present statistics on the joint frequency of
those characteristics-for example, the proportion of the population that
possesses all three. These statistics are typically estimated from data on the
frequency of the individual markers rather than from direct observation.
Forensic scientists operate on the assumption that the genetic markers they
use are independent of one another. 46 Accordingly, they compute the
frequency of a combination of genetic markers by applying the product rule,
which holds that the frequency of several independent events occurring
simultaneously may be determined by simply multiplying the probability that
each event will occur. If a match is found on three markers occurring in 5, 10,
42. Barker & Clarke, Examination of Small Quantities of Lipsticks, 12 J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'Y 449
(1972).
43. Kaye, supra note 10, at 162. Suppose, for example, that the defendant is linked to the crime
by the presence of red clay soil on his boots matching the soil at the scene of the crime. Statistics on
the prevalence of red clay soil will be relevant only if they apply to the areas where the defendant
might have been. The frequency of a given type of soil in a study in California may not be
representative of the frequency of that soil type in Georgia.
44. Id.
45. R. NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN JUDGMENT 77-
88, 256-61 (1980).
46. Independence presumes that possession of a given phenotype on one marker system is not
associated with the possession of any particular phenotype on any other system.
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and 20 percent of the population respectively, they typically report to the jury
that the percentage of the population possessing all three markers is .05 x .10
x .20 = .001 or 0.1 percent.
The use of the product rule is well accepted for computing the frequency
of protein markers in blood because there is extensive evidence that these
markers are independent of one another. 4 7 Use of the product rule is
inappropriate, however, where the characteristics are not independent. If the
product rule is applied to events which are partially dependent, it may
significantly underestimate the frequency of their joint occurrence. A number
of courts have refused to allow computations based on the product rule unless
the proponent can show that the characteristics being multiplied are
independent, 48 but there are exceptions. 4 9 Hence, jurors sometimes must
evaluate whether the use of the product rule to compute the statistics in the
case was appropriate; where it is not, they must somehow take that problem
into account.
In some areas the courts must decide whether to admit computations
based on the product rule in the face of scientific uncertainty about the
independence of the relevant characteristics. For example, considerable
controversy has developed recently over the use of the product rule to
compute the frequency of so-called DNA fingerprints when conclusive data
have not appeared demonstrating that the genetic markers that make up the
print are independent of one another.50 While some courts have excluded the
DNA statistics on this ground, 5' others have admitted the statistics, holding
that any dispute over their accuracy should go to weight rather than
admissibility. 52 Consequently, in a number of cases in which DNA evidence
was presented, the issue. of the independence of DNA markers has been
thrown to the jury.53
47. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 605.
48. E.g., People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
49. E.g., State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 585 P.2d 563 (1978) (product rule applied to
determine the likelihood of matching bite marks in absence of demonstration of independence of
matching features).
50. In hearings on the admissibility of DNA statistics, some scientists have argued forcefully that
the relevant markers ought to be independent, but others have questioned whether this opinion
should be accepted in the absence of data to demonstrate its truth. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on
Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 503-04 (1989); Thompson & Ford, Is DNA Fingerprinting Ready for the Courts?,
125 NEW SCIENTIST 38, 43 (1990).
51. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (ruling DNA test results by a
commercial laboratory inadmissible based, in part, on the laboratory's failure to comply with a
request for information about its data base that would have allowed the defense to assess the
independence of the genetic markers); State v. Pennell, IN88-12-0051 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 20,
1989) (1989 WL 167430) (ruling statistics reported by the same lab inadmissible based, in part, on
the failure of the laboratory to produce adequate documentation for its claim that the markers are
independent).
52. E.g., People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Albany County Ct. 1988). See
Thompson & Ford, supra note 41, at 81-87 for a thorough discussion of this issue.
53. The jurors' evaluation of the scientific evidence concerning independence may be crucial in
such cases. In a hearing on the admissibility of DNA evidence in People v. Axell, CR23911 (Ventura
Super. Ct. May 22, 1989), experts for the prosecution, who assumed independence and applied the
product rule, testified that the frequency of defendant's DNA print was approximately one in 6
billion; experts called by the defense challenged the assumption of independence and testified that if
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A third potential problem arises because the probative value of associative
evidence (that is, evidence linking the defendant to the crime by showing a
match) sometimes depends on how the defendant has been selected as a
suspect. Where the defendant is selected for reasons unrelated to the
likelihood of a match linking him to the crime, the frequency of the matching
characteristic in the population from which the defendant was drawn is a
reasonable estimate of the likelihood of a coincidental match. In other words,
the frequency would provide the rough likelihood that the defendant would
have the characteristic if innocent. If one person in 100 has the blood type on
which the defendant and perpetrator match, for example, the probability is I
percent that the defendant would happen by chance to have this blood type, if
he is innocent. The frequency of the characteristic thus provides an index of
the likelihood of a coincidental match. Where the defendant is selected for
reasons that render him more or less likely than most people to have the
matching characteristic, however, the frequency of the characteristic in the
population does not reflect the likelihood of a coincidental match. If jurors
fail to appreciate this fact, they may misjudge the likelihood of a
misidentification and thereby over- or underestimate the value of the
associative evidence.
As an illustration of this selection phenomenon, imagine a hypothetical
murder case in which a long red hair (presumably from the killer) is found
clenched in the fist of the victim. The police apprehend the defendant
because he lives near the victim and has long red hair. Microscopic analysis
reveals a match between hair samples taken from the defendant and the hair
in the victim's hand with respect to thirteen distinguishable qualities such as
color, length, and coarseness. A forensic expert reports a research study
showing that the likelihood of a coincidental match between two hairs
randomly drawn from different people is one in 4500. 54 What is the
likelihood the defendant's hair would happen to match, as it does, if he is not
the source of the hair in the victim's fist? Assuming one trusts the forensic
report and the research, one is tempted to conclude the likelihood of a
coincidental match is one in 4500, but this is demonstrably wrong. The
defendant was selected, at least in part, because he has long red hair; thus, the
likelihood that his hair would match the hair in the victim's fist, even though
he is innocent, is undoubtedly far higher than the likelihood a randomly
drawn individual would match. The figure of one in 4500 greatly
underestimates the likelihood of a coincidental match in this case.
Perhaps the most blatant example of a selection effect occurred in the
infamous case of People v. Collins.55 A robbery was committed by a black man
with a beard and a mustache and a blond woman with a ponytail, who both
fled in a yellow convertible. Defendants were a couple fitting this description
the markers are not independent the frequency of the defendant's DNA print could be as high as one
in 50. See id. testimony of expert Lawrence Mueller.
54. For an actual case with similar facts, see State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978).
55. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
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apprehended in the vicinity of the robbery. To bolster a shaky eyewitness
identification, the prosecutor called to the stand a college mathematics
instructor and asked him to compute the frequency in the general population
of a couple having various characteristics possessed by defendants, for
example, a man with a beard, a man with a mustache, a blond woman, a
woman with pony tail, and a yellow convertible. The prosecutor supplied
"conservative" estimates of the frequency of these characteristics, and the
mathematician, applying the product rule, multiplied the frequencies together
to obtain a joint frequency of one in twelve million.
The California Supreme Court reversed the resulting conviction,
concluding that it was error to admit the frequency estimate when that figure
was not only likely to be overvalued by the jury but was computed on the
unsupported assumption that the characteristics were independent.
56
Although the evidence in Collins certainly suffers from these problems, the
major difficulty with the one in twelve million figure is that it purports to
measure the probability of a coincidental match between the defendants and
perpetrators but in fact does nothing of the sort. Assume that the
mathematician was correct in computing the frequency of a couple with the
stated characteristics to be one in twelve million. This figure might reflect the
likelihood of a coincidental match if the defendants had been selected for
reasons unrelated to the likelihood that they would possess the "matching"
characteristics. However, it clearly does not reflect the likelihood of a
coincidental match in the actual case, where defendants were selected
precisely because they possessed the relevant characteristics. The likelihood
of a match if these defendants are innocent is not one in twelve million, it is
one in one; that is to say that it is certain. 57
Courts and commentators have generally distinguished statistical
testimony like that in Collins from testimony regarding the frequency of
characteristics identified by forensic tests. 58 As the long red hair example
illustrates, however, the same sort of selection effect that renders the Collins
statistics problematic may also operate in cases involving forensic evidence,
albeit in a more subtle manner. 59 As a result, base rate statistics in these cases
56. Id. at 327, 438 P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
57. If correct, the one in 12 million figure is not irrelevant: it suggests a low likelihood that
another such couple would be found in the area and thus supports the conclusion that defendants are
the guilty couple. In a city of several million people, however, the likelihood of finding two couples
matching defendants' description might be reasonably high. In Collins the probability of a second
couple in the Los Angeles area matching the characteristics of the perpetrators was computed to be
.40. Id. at 333-35, 438 P.2d at 42-43, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
58. "[E]xpert testimony [in Collins] merely told the jury how to think-how to evaluate the fact
that the Collins's were in the vicinity of the crime .... Such 'no evidence' cases do not dictate the
outcome when meaningful statistical evidence permits a computation of the probability of a
coincidental misidentification." Kaye, supra note 10, at 167.
59. This problem is particularly likely to occur in cases in which forensic evidence shows a match
on some observable characteristic (e.g., hair, paint, fibers). In such cases the suspect is often selected
in a manner that renders him more likely than most people to "match" with regard to the relevant
characteristic. On the other hand, where the "match" is on a characteristic that is not easily observed
(e.g., blood type), it is less likely (though not inconceivable) that the characteristic played a role in
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will not always reflect the probability of a coincidental misidentification. A
key issue with regard to jury competence is whetherjurors appreciate and take
into account such phenomena.
4. Presentation of Base Rate Statistics. The difficulty jurors face in interpreting
base rate statistics is compounded because these statistics may be presented in
several different ways. Where forensic evidence shows a match, experts in
most cases simply report the frequency of the matching characteristic or set of
characteristics in a reference population, using percentages or incidence
rates. It is common for experts to report, for example, that "type 0 blood is
found in 44 percent of Caucasians" or that "among Hispanics, three persons
in 100 possess both ABO type 0 and PGM-Type 2 enzyme markers." But
other formulations are sometimes used. In People v. Harbold,6 ° for example,
serologist Mark Stolorow testified regarding the probability of a coincidental
match between two individuals: " 'the chances of selecting any two people at
random from the population and having them accidently [sic] have identical
blood types in each one of these factors is less than one in 500, that is, what
we call the probability of an accidental match is less than one in 500.' "61
While it is tempting to assume that the frequency of a characteristic is
equivalent to what Stolorow calls the probability of an accidental match, this is
not the case. The probability of an accidental match actually equals the
square of the frequency. If 10 percent of the population has blood type B, for
example, the probability of selecting two people at random and finding they
both have type B is .10 x .10 .01, or one in 100. Thus, the impressive
sounding conclusion that there is one chance in 500 of an accidental match is
equivalent to the somewhat less impressive statement that the matching
characteristics would be found in approximately one person in twenty-two. 62
Whether jurors appreciate this distinction between frequency and probability
of accidental match is unclear.
To complicate matters, the probability of an accidental match on a genetic
marker system is not necessarily equivalent to the probability of an accidental
match on a particular marker. Consider, for example, the frequency of
markers in the well-known ABO system. The probability that two randomly
chosen individuals will share the same ABO type (not taking into account
which type it is) is approximately 38 percent, while the probability they will
both share a specific type ranges from 19 percent for type A to 0.16 percent
for type AB. 63 Hence, it is crucial to know whether one is referring to an
the selection of the suspect and therefore less likely that the probability of a coincidental match
diverges from the frequency of the matching characteristic.
60. 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1984).
61. Id. at 381, 464 N.E.2d at 748.
62. It is possible that the underlying data Stolorow wished to report actuallv indicated a
frequency of one in 500 for blood characteristics in question and that Stolorow mistak'enlv assumed
that this frequency was equivalent to the probability of an accidental match. The appellate opinion
leaves this point unclear.
63. The frequency of ABO types and the probability of an "accidental match" with respect to
each type (and any type) is shown in the following table:
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accidental match on a system or on a specific marker within that system. But it
may be difficult to tell from testimony such as Stolorow's 6 4 which of these
terms is being reported. In addition, several different terms might be
described in language that sounds similar. Suppose, for example, that the
defendant and perpetrator share blood type AB. An expert might be quite
correct in stating any of the following: (1) the probability of a match between
two randomly chosen people in this system is 38 percent; (2) the probability
of match between two randomly chosen people on this marker is 0.16 percent
and (3) the probability a randomly chosen individual will have this marker is 4
percent. Whether jurors can and will appreciate the differences among these
similar-sounding formulations is difficult to predict, but clearly this is an
important issue underlying jury competence to deal with such data.
The difficulty jurors face in correctly interpreting base rate statistics
becomes even greater when those statistics are reported in a misleading
manner. Appellate opinions provide examples of erroneous and misleading
statistical presentations. One error is to use base rate data to characterize the
probability that someone other than the defendant was the source of an evidentiary
sample. In State v. Carlson,6 5 for example, forensic hair expert Barry Gaudette
testified that there was "a 1-in-800 chance that the pubic hairs stuck to the
victim were not Carlson's and a 1-in-4,500 chance that the head hairs found
on the victim were not Carlson's. ' 66
The problem with Gaudette's testimony is that it draws conclusions about
the probability that the hairs "were not Carlson's." Obviously the hairs are
either Carlson's or someone else's, so if Gaudette is correct in reporting one
chance in 4500 the hairs were not Carlson's, it follows that there is a 4499 in
4500 chance they were Carlson's. Gaudette cannot properly testify to this
effect, however, because conclusions about the likelihood that the hairs were
Carlson's cannot be drawn from the forensic evidence alone. If one person in
4500 would have hair matching that found on the victim, thousands of people,
besides Carlson, must have such hair. To determine the likelihood the hair
TABLE I
FREQUENCY OF ABO TYPES
Type Frequency Probability of





Overall (any type) .3816
Because the frequency of type 0 is .44, the probability that two individuals drawn at random will
both be type 0 is .44 2 = .19; that both will be type A is .42 2 = .18; that both will be type B is .102 =
.01; and that both will be AB is .04 2 = .0016. Accordingly, the probability that two individuals will
both have the same ABO type is .19 + .18 + .01 + .0016 = .3816. Selvin & Grunbaum, Genetic
,Mlarker Determination m Evidence Bloodstains: The Effect of Classification Errors on Probability of .Von-
discrimiination ond Probability of Concordance, 27 J. FORENSIC ScI. Soc'Y 57 (1987).
64. See snpra text accompanying note 60.
65. 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978).
66. Id. at 173. See Gaudette & Keeping, supra note 39, at 605; Gaudette, snpra note 40, at 517.
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was Carlson's, we must consider whether the hair is more likely to have come
from Carlson than from one of the thousands of other people with matching
hair. One cannot make this determination, however, without evaluating the
other evidence against Carlson, and therein lies the problem. Gaudette was in
no position to evaluate the strength of the other evidence against Carlson and
had no business doing so in any case. Hence, his opinion about the likelihood
the hair was not Carlson's is not only unwarranted, but it also invades the
province of the jury in a particularly insidious way, because the jurors are
unlikely to realize that Gaudette's statistics rest, in part, on assumptions
about the strength of evidence unrelated to the hair.
B. Error Rate Statistics
A second type of statistical formulation jurors may encounter in criminal
trials concerns the rate of error in forensic tests.
1. Sources of Error Rate Statistics. The major source of error rate statistics is
proficiency testing. A typical proficiency test is a blind trial in which forensic
analysts are asked to classify specimens of known origin in order to check
their accuracy. Studies of this type have provided considerable evidence that
forensic testing is less than perfectly reliable. In 1974, the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration ("LEAA") of the Justice Department undertook a
large-scale study of the proficiency of crime labs in the United States. 67
Between 235 and 240 laboratories took part in the blind trial, and the results,
in the words of one commentator, were "shocking." 6s Over 20 percent of the
labs inaccurately or incompletely identified samples of hair and paint, while
over 30 percent of the labs inaccurately or incompletely identified glass and
soil samples. Furthermore, less than 30 percent accurately or completely
identified one sample of blood.
Error rates in blood typing are probably the best documented.
Nationwide proficiency tests were conducted by the LEAA in 1975 and by the
Forensic Sciences Foundation between 1978 and 1983.69 Hundreds of blood
samples of known type were sent to crime laboratories, which were asked to
classify the samples while remaining "blind" to their type. The rate of
classification errors varied among the different genetic marker systems used,
ranging from 0.3 percent for the Adenosine deaminase system to over 6
percent for the familiar ABO system.70 Because crime labs typically "type"
blood on up to eight different systems, the likelihood of an error cumulates.
Based on the proficiency test data, Selvin and Grunbaum concluded that
67. J. PETERSON, E. FABRICANT & K. FIELD, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING RESEARCH
PROGRAM-FINAL REPORT TO U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (1978).
68. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientfic Evidence: A Primer on Evaluating the l1'eight
of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 268 (1981).
69. G. SENSABAUGH & D. NORTHEY, WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE PROFICIENCY [RIALS? AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTROPHORETIC TYPING RESULTS, 1975-83 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON THE FORENSIC APPLICATIONS OF ELECTROPHORESIS 184 (1986). See also Selvin &
Grunbaurn, supra note 63. at 59.
70. See Selvin & Grunbaum, supra note 63, at 59.
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"blood group evidence employing [all] eight systems will be incorrect in some
way in excess of 20 percent of the time." 7 1
Blind trials have also been conducted recently to determine the proficiency
of three commercial laboratories doing DNA typing of forensic samples.
Asked to test approximately fifty unknown blood and semen samples, two of
the labs had a "false-positive"; that is, they mistakenly declared a match in an
instance where the pair of samples being compared actually came from
different people. 72
In addition to proficiency tests administered by outside agencies, many
forensic laboratories engage in routine internal proficiency testing. These
studies are potentially another source of data on error rates.
2. Drawing Conclusions from Error Rate Statistics: Potential Problems and
Complexities. Like base .rate statistics, error rate statistics are often highly
relevant and informative, but must be interpreted with care because their
probative value depends on a variety of factors. Jurors may be misled by such
statistics if they fail to take these factors into account. However, the weight
jurors should give to these factors is often unclear in a given instance. One
important factor jurors should consider is whether aggregate data produced
by proficiency testing of many labs accurately represent the rate of error in
any particular lab. Large-scale proficiency tests such as those of the LEAA,
for example, typically involve a number of laboratories, which are not
individually identified. Consequently, it has been suggested that errors on
proficiency tests result from inadequate training of a minority of analysts and
tend to cluster in a few "bad" labs. As a result, aggregate data on error rates
from proficiency tests greatly overstate the likelihood of an error by a
competent analyst at a "good" lab. 73 A second consideration is whether error
rates on proficiency tests reflect error rates in routine casework. In most
proficiency tests, the laboratory personnel know they are being tested and
may therefore be on their best behavior. Finally, jurors must consider
whether error rates in the past predict the rate of errors in the future. One
purpose of proficiency testing is to detect inadequacies in laboratory
procedure that may contribute to error. Laboratories which have been
"caught" making errors on proficiency tests sometimes change procedures in
an effort to improve future performance.
71. Id. at 61.
72. One of the laboratories also had three false negatives, although these errors were initially
covered up by the agency doing the testing. Ford & Thompson, A Question of Identity: Some Reasonable
Doubts About DNA "Fingerprints, " THE SCIENCES, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 37, 41. The third lab had no false
positives, but was unwilling to make a call on 14 of the samples and, in a follow-up study, twice failed
to detect that mixed stains contained the DNA of two individuals. M. Graves & M. Kuo, DNA: A
Blind Trial Study of Three Commercial Testing Laboratories (Feb. 1989) (paper presented at the
meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, Las Vegas, Nev.).
73. G. SENSABAUGH & D. NORTHLY, supra note 69. On the other hand, aggregate data may
underestimate the rate of error at a "bad" lab. Hence, jurors must evaluate whether a particular lab
is more or less error-prone than average to draw appropriate conclusions from aggregate error rate
data.
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A more subtle issue concerns the connection between the error rate of a
test and the likelihood of a result that would falsely.incriminate an innocent
defendant. Not every error is of the sort that incriminates; therefore, the
error rate of a test is not necessarily equivalent to the likelihood 'that an
innocent person would be falsely incriminated. Suppose a bloodstain found
at the scene of a crime is tested to see whether it matches that of a suspect,
who is known to have type A blood. Assuming the stain is actually type 0, the
suspect will be falsely incriminated if the stain is misclassified as type A, but
not if it is misclassified as type B or AB. The key issue, then, is not the overall
error rate of the test but the rate at which types other than A are misclassified
as type A. This error rate is sometimes called the false-positive rate for A. If
errors are distributed randomly across the different blood types, the false-
positive rate for a particular phenotype, such as type A, will be lower than the
overall error rate for the test because only a subset of errors will be false-
positives. If errors do not occur at random, however, the false-positive rate
may be either higher or lower than the error rate. Suppose, for example, that
there is an error rate of 6 percent in ABO typing, but that all of the errors
occur when type 0 is misclassified as type A. In this instance, the false-
positive rate for A would be higher than 6 percent while the false-positive rate
for 0, B, and AB would be zero. Although the connection between the error
rate and the false-positive rate is not obvious in many instances, it is common
for forensic scientists to report proficiency data in a form that allows
inferences only about the overall error rate. The ability of jurors to draw
appropriate conclusions from such data is open to question.
3. Presentation of Statistics. Although error rate statistics of this type are
available in the published literature, they apparently are presented
infrequently in criminal trials. A group of fifty forensic scientists surveyed by
Miller74 reported that they rarely presented data on error rates in court.
Error rate data may be presented infrequently, in part, because attorneys are
simply unfamiliar with it. Forensic scientists who are called to present the
findings of forensic tests are unlikely to be examined extensively about error
rates by the proponent of the evidence. While lawyers who cross-examine
forensic experts are advised to probe extensively regarding the reliability of
the procedure, 75 experts may be unwilling to phrase their estimates of error
rates in statistical terms, or even to admit the possibility of error. In State v.
Spencer, 76 for example, an expert responded to questions about the reliability
of neutron activation analysis, a notoriously unreliable procedure, 77 by
declaring "[t]here is no unreliability as far as we are concerned."-78 To
challenge or even to detect such overstatements may require the attorney to
74. N. Miller, supra note 10.
75. E. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATIACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1982).
76. 298 Minn. 456, 216 N.W.2d 131 (1974).
77. George, Statistical Problems Relating to Scientific Evidence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
128 (E. Irnwinkelried 2d ed. 1981).
78. Spencer. 298 Minn. at 459, 216 N.W.2d at 134.
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seek the assistance of another expert, whose services may be difficult to obtain
or beyond the financial means of the defendant. 79
Error rate statistics may also be used sparingly due to confusion about the
meaning of errors on proficiency tests in relation to the reliability of a given
procedure. Like data on the frequency of trace characteristics, error rate data
are sketchy. Nevertheless, like frequency data, they provide some clue as to
the likelihood of a wrong result. Whether jurors draw the appropriate
conclusions from such data depends on their ability to appreciate the many
subtle ways in which such statistics may be misleading. Whether lay
individuals are capable of this task is an unexplored issue.
III
JURORS' USE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE: MAJOR CONCERNS AND
RESEARCH STRATEGIES
Social scientists have recently begun studying whether lay individuals can
draw appropriate conclusions from statistical evidence of the type presented
in criminal trials. The standard research strategy is the jury simulation study,
in which individuals read summaries of evidence and are asked to judge the
guilt of a hypothetical criminal defendant. The nature of the evidence can be
varied to determine, for example, how variations in the manner in which
statistical evidence is presented affect people's judgments.
A major goal of the social scientists is to assess whether people use
statistical evidence appropriately. To answer this question there must, of
course, be some standard of appropriateness against which people's
judgments can be compared. The benchmark used by researchers has been a
set of mathematical models based on Bayes' theorem.80 These models can
specify how much one should revise one's estimate of a criminal suspect's
probability of guilt after receiving forensic evidence accompanied by
statistics.8 ' Assuming a juror initially thinks that there is a 20 percent chance
79. M. Saks & R. Van Duizend, supra note 1, at 89.
80. For a general discussion of the use of Bayes' theorem to model legal judgments, see R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 148-53 (1st ed. 1977); Kaplan, Decision
Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Kaye, What is Bayesianism? A Guide for
the Perplexed, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 161 (1988); Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021
(1977); Schum & Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence, 17 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 105 (1982).
81. Where H and I designate the suspect's guilt and innocence respectively, and E designates
evidence of a match between the suspect and perpetrator on some characteristic, Bayes' theorem
states:
p(H/E) = p(H)p(E/H) / [p(H)p(E/H) + p(Fi)p(E/17i)]
The term p(H) is read "the probability of H"; this term is called the prior probability and reflects the
decisionmaker's initial estimate of the probability the suspect is guilty in light of everything that is
known before receiving E. The term p(H/E) is read "the probability of H given E": this term is
called the posterior probability and indicates what the decisionnaker's revised estimate of probable
guilt should be in light of everything known after receiving E. The formula indicates that the
evidence of a match, E, should cause the decisionmaker to revise his opinion of the suspect's guilt to
the extent p(E/H) differs from p(E/Hi). If the suspect and perpetrator are certain to match if the
suspect is guilty, p(E/H) = 1.00. If an innocent suspect is no more likely than anyone else to possess
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a particular suspect is guilty, for example, the models can tell him how much
he should revise this estimate after receiving additional evidence that the
suspect has genetic markers matching those found in the perpetrator's blood
and that those markers occur in only 5 percent of the population. 82
A major research strategy, then, is to determine whether people revise
their judgments to the extent that Bayes' theorem dictates after receiving
statistical evidence. Researchers are not particularly concerned with whether
people's judgments correspond exactly to the predictions of Bayesian models.
No one argues that jurors must be perfect intuitive Bayesians to be considered
competent to deal with statistical data. Instead, the research has focused on
three major concerns: first, whether people evaluate statistical evidence using
inappropriate judgmental strategies that could lead to serious errors in
estimating the value of the evidence, and therefore to dramatic divergence of
human judgment from Bayesian norms; second, whether people are
insensitive to important statistical variations in evidence and therefore fail to
distinguish strong and weak evidence as effectively as the Bayesian models
suggest they should; finally, whether people are insensitive to nonstatistical
factors that affect the value of statistical evidence, such as partial redundancies
between statistical evidence and other evidence in the case. By comparing
actual judgments to those specified by Bayesian models, one can test
sensitivity to such factors. In the sections that follow, each of these concerns
will be discussed in some detail in light of the available empirical research and
commentary.
A. Inappropriate Judgmental Strategies: Fallacious Interpretation of
Statistical Evidence
1. The Prosecutor's Fallacy. One of the major concerns that has been raised
about population proportions and statistics on the probability of a match is
that jurors will mistakenly assume these statistics directly measure the
probability of the defendant's innocence. A juror who hears that the
defendant and perpetrator share a blood type found in 10 percent of the
population, for example, may reason that there is only a 10 percent chance
that the defendant would happen to have this blood type if innocent. The
juror may then jump to the mistaken conclusion that there is therefore a 90
percent chance that the defendant is guilty. Thompson and Schumann, 3 who
the matching characteristic, p(E/H) is equal to the frequency of the matching characteristic in the
population from which the suspect was drawn.
82. The prior probability of guilt, p(H) is equal to .20, and because the suspect must be either
guilty or innocent, p(H) = .80. Because the suspect is certain to have the perpetrator's genetic
markers if he is the perpetrator, p(E/H) = 1.00; and because the suspect is no more likely than
anyone else to have those genetic markers if he is not guilty, p(E/H) = .05, the frequency of the
markers in the population. These probabilites may be plugged into the Bayesian formula in note 81,
supra, allowing one to solve for p(H/E), which in this case equals .83. In other words, learning that
the suspect and perpetrator match on a characteristic found in 5% of the population should cause
the decisionmaker to revise his estimate of likelihood of guilt from 10% to 83%.
83. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9.
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call this mistake "the Prosecutor's Fallacy," explain the error by applying the
underlying logic to a different problem:
Suppose you are asked to judge the probability a man is a lawyer based on the fact he
owns a briefcase. Let us assume all lawyers own a briefcase but only one person in ten
in the general population owns a briefcase. Following the [fallacious] logic, you would
jump to the conclusion that there is a 90 percent chance the man is a lawyer. But this
conclusion is obviously wrong. We know that the number of nonlawyers is many times
greater than the number of lawyers. Hence, lawyers are probably outnumbered by
briefcase owners who are not lawyers (and a given briefcase owner is more likely to be
a nonlawyer than a lawyer). To draw conclusions about the probability the man is a
lawyer based on the fact he owns a briefcase, we must consider not just the incidence
rate of briefcase ownership, but also the a priori likelihood of being a lawyer.
Similarly, to draw conclusions about the probability a criminal suspect is guilty based
on evidence of a "match," we must consider not just the percentage of people who
would match but also the a priori likelihood that the defendant in question is guilty.
8 4
The possibility that jurors might confuse population proportions with the
probability of innocence was first raised by Laurence Tribe in his classic
article, "Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process."-8 5
Discussing a murder case in which a partial palm print matching the
defendant's is found on the murder weapon and a forensic expert testifies
that such prints appear in no more than one case in a thousand, Tribe notes:
"By itself, of course, the 'one-in-a-thousand' statistic is not a very meaningful
one. It does not ... measure the probability of the defendant's innocence-
although many jurors would be hard-pressed to understand why not."8 6
Tribe sees no problem with the admissibility of the forensic evidence of the
match, but argues that the presentation of frequency data in connection with
this evidence creates a serious danger of prejudice:
To be sure, the finding of so relatively rare a print which matches the defendant's is an
event of significant probative value, an event of which the jury should almost certainly
be informed. Yet the numerical index of the print's rarity, as measured by the frequency
of its random occurrence, may be more misleading than enlightening, and the jury
should be informed of that frequency-if at all-only if it is also given a careful
explanation that there might well be many other individuals with similar prints.
8 7
Relying largely on Tribe's arguments, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in
an interesting series of cases, has greatly limited the admissibility of statistics
in connection with forensic evidence. No other appellate court has been as
restrictive. The Minnesota opinions are worth examining in some detail
because they raise a number of key issues about the competence of jurors to
deal with statistics.
In State v. Carlson,8 8 a rape and murder case in which hairs and semen were
recovered from the victim, the court held that it was error (although
nonprejudicial error) to admit statistical testimony on the probability of a
match of characteristics. Specifically, the court found error in the admission
of testimony by forensic hair expert Barry Gaudette that there was "a l-in-800
84. ld. at 170.
85. Iribe, supra note 8.
86. Id. at 1355.
87. Id.
88. 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978).
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chance that the pubic hairs stuck to the victim were not Carlson's and a 1-in-
4,500 chance that the head hairs found on the victim were not Carlson's."' 9
Carlson argued that Gaudette's testimony "goes one step too far toward
an ultimate conclusion of fact and therefore invades the province of the jury,"
and the court apparently agreed. 90 As the court saw it, however, the problem
was not so much that Gaudette had used statistics improperly as that he had
used statistics at all.
Our concern over this evidence is not with the adequacy of its foundation, but rather
with its potentially exaggerated impact on the trier of fact. Testimony expressing
opinions br conclusions in terms of statistical probabilities can make the uncertain
seem all but proven, and suggest, by quantification, satisfaction of the requirement
that guilt be established "beyond a reasonable doubt." See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics,
84 HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
Diligent cross-examination may in some cases minimize statistical manipulation
and confine the scope of probability testimony. We are not convinced, however, that
such rebuttal would dispel the psychological impact of the suggestion of mathematical
precision, and we share the concern for "the substantial unfairness to a defendant
which may result from ill conceived techniques with which the trier of fact is not
technically equipped to cope." People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 332, 66 Cal. Rptr. 505,
438 P.2d 41. For these reasons we believe Gaudette's [statistical] testimony . . . was
improperly received. 9
Although Carlson left it unclear whether the court's objection is to all
frequency data or only statistics on the probability of a match, a subsequent
case, State v. Boyd,92 reveals that the court was troubled by a broad range of
statistical formulations.
In Boyd, a rape case, the prosecutor sought to show that the defendant had
fathered the victim's child in order to prove he had achieved sexual
penetration. Deciding a pretrial appeal of a trial court's decision to suppress
the results of a paternity test, the court allowed evidence that a paternity test
had failed to exclude the defendant as a possible father, but rejected
accompanying statistical testimony on the percentage of men in the general
population that the test would also exclude, as well as a statistical calculation
of the "probability of paternity." The court again cited Tribe as support for
its conclusion that
there is a real danger that the jury will use the [statistical] evidence as a measure of the
probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the evidence will thereby
undermine the presumption of innocence, erode the values served by the reasonable
doubt standard, and dehumanize our system ofjustice, 93
The most recent case in this line is State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 94 another rape
case, in which the prosecution appealed the trial court's decision to exclude
statistics offered in connection with serological tests performed on the
defendant and a semen sample extracted from the victim. The test results
showed a match on a set of genetic markers that occur in only 3.6 percent of
89. Id. at 173.
90. Id. at 175.
91. Id. at 176 (footnote omitted).
92. 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1978).
93. Id. at 483.
94. 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987).
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
the population. The frequency of the set of markers was computed by
determining the frequency of each marker separately and then multiplying
those frequencies together in accordance with the product rule. The court
rejected the use of this frequency calculation on the grounds that it might be
mistaken by the jury for the probability of Kim's innocence:
[T]he expert called by the state ... should not be permitted to express an opinion as
to the probability that the semen is Kim's and should not be permitted to get around
this by expressing the opinion in terms of the percentage of men in the general
population with the same frequency of combinations of blood types.
9 5
Retreating slightly from its previous rejection of all frequency statistics,
however, the court allowed testimony as to the percentage of men in the
population who possess each of the individual matching genetic markers. 96
The court apparently believed these constituent probabilities were less likely
to be prejudicial.
2. Underutilization of Statistical Evidence. In striking contrast to the concerns
of Tribe and the Minnesota Supreme Court about the prejudicial potential of
statistical evidence, other commentators have raised the opposite concern-
that jurors will give statistics too little weight. Saks and Kidd criticise Tribe's
analysis, calling it "a Swiss cheese of assumptions about human behavior-in
this case human decision-making processes- which are asserted as true
simply because they fall within the wide reach of the merely plausible, not
because any evidence is adduced on their behalf." 97 Based on an extensive
review of psychological studies on human judgment and decisionmaking, Saks
and Kidd challenge arguments that statistics are inordinately persuasive and
suggest that the reverse is true.98
A major psychological finding underlying Saks and Kidd's conclusion is
the existence of the so-called base rate fallacy: the tendency for people, when
judging the likelihood of an event, to ignore or underutilize statistical
information on the base rate frequency of the event.99 This tendency has
been observed in a large number of studies. 100 When asked to judge whether
a man described in a short vignette is a lawyer or an engineer, for example,
people are nearly as likely to say he is a lawyer when told he was selected at
random from a group consisting of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers as when told
he was selected from a group consisting of 30 lawyers and 70 engineers.' 0 '
The base rate data have relatively little impact on the judgment. "Only at the
extremes of the distributions, where the group approaches 100 lawyers and 0
95. Id. at 549.
96. Id.
97. Saks & Kidd, supra note 8, at 125.
98. Id. at 149.
99. For reviews, see 3 E. BORGIDA & N. BREKKE, THE BASE-RATE FALLACY IN ATrRIBUTION AND
PREDICTION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN A-rrRIBUTION RESEARCH (1981); Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in
Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 211 (1980).
100. 3 E. BORGIDA & N. BREKKE, supra note 99; Bar-Hillel, supra note 99.
101. Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology o] Prediction, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 237, 241-43
(1973).
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engineers (or the converse) do the decision makers become sensitive to the
information about group composition."'' 0 2
The example of the base rate fallacy most relevant to jury competence is
people's response to the well-known cab problem developed by psychologists
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky:' 0 3
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green
and the Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data:
(a) 85 percent of the cabs in the city are Green and 15 percent are Blue.
(b) a witness identified the cab as Blue ....
[U]nder the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident ... the
witness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80 percent of the time and
failed 20 percent of the time.
What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather than
Green? 1
0 4
This problem, and a number of similar problems, have been posed in
dozens of psychological research studies. 10 5 As Saks and Kidd report, the
typical probability response is 80 percent, although in actuality, the evidence
given leads to a probability of 41 percent that the responsible cab was blue.' 0 6
By judging the probability to be 80 percent, people are, in effect, ignoring the
low base rate of blue cabs.
People's insensitivity to base rates in hypothetical problems of this type
leads Saks and Kidd to suggest, in direct contradiction to Tribe and the
Minnesota Supreme Court, that jurors are likely to pay little heed to base
rates in actual legal proceedings. "[S]tatistical data need not be regarded as
so overwhelming as some have supposed, and therefore they ought not to be
considered prejudicial. The more realistic problem is presenting statistical
evidence so that people will incorporate it into their decisions at all."t1 7
It is important to notice, however, that the cab problem, as well as other
problems revealing a "base rate fallacy," concerns the use of what this article
has called "directly relevant" base rates, while the type of statistical evidence
of concern to the Minnesota Supreme Court is "indirectly relevant" base
rates. Thompson and Schumann have suggested that the two types of
statistics "are likely to play a different role in the people's inferences" and
therefore that the tendency to underutilize directly relevant base rates may
102. Saks & Kidd, supra note 8, at 128.
103. See Tversky & Kahneman, Causal Schemata in judgments Under Uncertainty, in PROGRESS IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 49 (M. Fishbein ed. 1980); Tversky & Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Baserates, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Dahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds.
1982) [hereinafter Evidential Impact].
104. Tversky & Kahneman, Evidential Impact, supra note 103, at 156-57.
105. See 3 E. BORGIDA & N. BREKKE, supra note 99; Bar-Hillel, supra note 99.
106. Saks & Kidd, supra note 8, at 128. The correct solution to the problem may be obtained by
applying Bayes' theorem. See supra notes 81, 82. The prior probability that the cab was blue, p(H), is
.15 (and p(H) = .85) because 15% of the cabs in the city are blue. This prior probability must be
revised in light of evidence, E, that the witness identified the cab as blue. Because the witness is
accurate 80% of the time, p(E/H) - .80 and p(E/H) = .20. Plugging these values into the Bayesian
formula in note 81, supra, one can solve for p(H/E) and see that it is .41.
107. Saks & Kidd, supra note 8, at 149.
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not generalize to indirectly relevant base rates.' 08 Thus, although Saks and
Kidd marshal impressive evidence that statistics in general, and directly
relevant base rates in particular, tend to be underutilized, 10 9 their analysis
does not rule out the possibility that jurors may sometimes give too much
weight to indirectly relevant base rates by falling victim to the Prosecutor's
Fallacy of confusing the frequency of a matching characteristic with the
probability of innocence.
3. Jury Simulation Studies. Additional light has been cast on the issue by
recent studies of how simulated jurors react to statistical evidence when
judging the guilt of hypothetical criminal defendants.'10 In a typical study,
mock jurors are asked to estimate the probability that a hypothetical
defendant is guilty based on a description of the evidence against him. The
jurors are then asked to revise their initial estimate after receiving additional
evidence indicating that the defendant and perpetrator share a characteristic,
for example, a blood type, and specifying the statistical frequency of that
characteristic. The weight jurors give to the evidence of the match is inferred
from the extent to which they revise their estimates of probability of guilt after
receiving it. A juror who initially thought the probability of guilt was 10
percent but revised his estimate to 90 percent after hearing about the match
has given more weight to the evidence than a juror who revised the initial
estimate from 10 percent to 15 percent. One advantage of assessing the
weight mock jurors give to evidence in this manner is that it allows a direct
comparison of human judgments to Bayesian predictions."' By using this
approach, researchers can identify situations in which people give more or
less weight to evidence than would be specified by Bayesian norms. It is also
possible to detect instances in which people fall victim to the Prosecutor's
Fallacy by determining whether they equate the frequency of a matching
characteristic with the probability of innocence. In a case where the
defendant and perpetrator matched on a characteristic found in 2 percent of
the population, for example, a victim of the fallacy would always say the
probability of guilt was 98 percent, regardless of the strength of the other
evidence.
The studies generally find that some mock jurors make judgments
consistent with the Prosecutor's Fallacy, although victims of this fallacy appear
to be a small minority in most instances. For example, in the first study of this
type, Thompson and Schuman asked 144 undergraduates to read a
description of a hypothetical case involving the robbery of a liquor store by a
man wearing a ski mask.' 12 The police apprehended a suspect near the store
who matched the store clerk's description of the robber's height, weight, and
108. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9, at 169.
109. Saks & Kidd, supra note 8, at 132-45, 148-49.
110. Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 9; Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9; J. Goodman, supra
note 9; E. Schumann & W. Thompson, supra note 9.
111. See supra notes 81-82.
112. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9, at 172-76.
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clothing. In a trash can nearby, the police found the mask and the money.
Subjects were asked, at this point, to give an initial estimate of the probability
of the suspect's guilt. Then they read a summary of testimony by a forensic
expert who reported that hair found in the ski mask matched the suspect's
hair and that the frequency in the general population of hair that would match
the suspect's was 2 percent. The subjects then made a final estimate of the
suspect's probability of guilt. On average, about 13 percent of subjects
judged the suspect's probability of guilt to be exactly 98 percent, which is the
probability one would obtain by simply assuming that the frequency of the
matching characteristic equals the probability of innocence. These subjects'
comments during debriefing confirmed that they had fallen victim to the
Prosecutor's Fallacy.' 13 In other studies of this type, the percent of subjects
making judgments consistent with the Prosecutor's Fallacy has been lower,
ranging from about 1 percent to 8 percent.' 14
These studies also find evidence of a second fallacy, which Thompson and
Schumann have labeled the "Defense Attorney's Fallacy."'' 5 This fallacy is
the erroneous assumption that evidence of a match between the defendant
and perpetrator on a rare characteristic is irrelevant to the defendant's
likelihood of guilt. 1 16 For example, in a case where the defendant and
perpetrator match on a characteristic found in 1 percent of the population,
victims of this fallacy might reason that in a city of one million people there
would be approximately 10,000 people with the relevant characteristic. They
then might erroneously conclude that there is little, if any, probative value in
the fact that the defendant and perpetrator both belong to such a large group.
This reasoning is fallacious because the great majority of the 10,000 people
with the relevant blood type are not suspects in the case and because the
blood-test evidence drastically narrows the group of individuals who are or
could be suspects without eliminating the very individual on whom suspicion
has already focused. Victims of the Defense Attorney's Fallacy give no weight
to evidence of a match on a rare characteristic. Consequently, in simulation
studies their initial and final judgments of probability of guilt are identical. In
the same study by Thompson and Schumann, described above, in which 13
percent of subjects made judgments consistent with the Prosecutor's Fallacy,
another 12 percent made judgments consistent with the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy.' 17 Hence, one quarter of the subjects made judgments consistent
with fallacious reasoning.
Susceptibility to the fallacious reasoning appeared to depend in part on
how the statistical evidence was presented. When the frequency of the
113. Id. at 173 n.5.
114. In a second study reported by Thompson and Schumann, only 4% of subjects made
judgments consistent with the prosecutor's fallacy. Id. at 177-81. Two similar studies reported by
Goodman found rates of 1.6% and 8%. J. Goodman, supra note 9, at 8, 20.
115. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9, at 171.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 173.
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matching characteristic was presented as a conditional probability,'18 the
percentage of judgments consistent with the Prosecutor's Fallacy was higher
(22 percent) and the percentage consistent with the Defense Attorney's
Fallacy was lower (8 percent).'' 9 When the frequency was presented as a
percentage and incidence rate,' 20 the percentage of judgments consistent
with the Prosecutor's Fallacy dropped to 4 percent but the percentage
consistent with the Defense Attorney's Fallacy rose to 17 percent.'
2
'
Although these findings are suggestive, their practical significance is
difficult to judge without more information. One limitation of the materials
used in the study is that they included no arguments about the way statistical
evidence should be used. In actual cases, jurors are likely to hear such
arguments from attorneys or from other jurors during deliberation, so it is
important to determine how people respond to them. Can people recognize
the flaw in an argument for a fallacious position? Suppose they hear two
fallacious arguments for contrary positions. How will they respond?
These questions were explored in a second study by Thompson and
Schumann that was similar to the first' 22 except that before subjects made
final judgments of guilt, they received arguments. 23  One argument
advocated the Prosecutor's Fallacy:
The blood test evidence is highly relevant. The suspect has the same blood type as the
attacker. This blood type is found in only 1% of the population, so there is only a 1%
chance that the blood found at the scene came from someone other than the suspect.
Since there is only a 1% chance that someone else committed the crime, there is a
99% chance the suspect is guilty. 1
2 4
The other argument advocated the Defense Attorney's Fallacy:
The evidence about blood types has very little relevance for this case. Only 1% of the
population has the "rare" blood type, but in a city . . . [1like the one where the crime
occurred with a population of 200,000 this blood type would be found in
approximately 2000 people. Therefore the evidence merely shows that the suspect is
one of 2000 people in the city who might have committed the crime. A one-in-2000
chance of guilt (based on the blood test evidence) has little relevance for proving this
suspect guilty. 125
Half the subjects read the prosecutor's argument first followed by the
defendant's, while the other half read the arguments in reverse order. After
reading each set of arguments, subjects were asked to indicate whether they
thought either was correct and to judge the suspect's probability of guilt.
Most subjects found at least one of the fallacious arguments convincing.
Twenty-nine percent thought the argument for the Prosecutor's Fallacy was
118. The expert stated there was "only a two percent chance [that] the defendant's would be
indistinguishable from that of the perpetrator if he were innocent . Id.
119. Id. at 174.
120. The expert stated that 2 percent of people have hair that would be indistinguishable and that
in a city of 1,000,000 people there would be approximately 20,000 such individuals. Id. at 173.
121. Id. al 174.
122. The case involved evidence of a match between the suspect and perpetrator on a blood type
found in 1% of the population. Id. at 177-81.
123. Id. at 177.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 178.
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correct.' 2 6 Sixty-eight percent thought the argument for the Defense
Attorney's Fallacy was correct.' 2 7 Only 22 percent correctly concluded that
both arguments were incorrect.' 2 8
Not surprisingly, after hearing the arguments a much higher percentage of
subjects made judgments consistent with fallacious reasoning than in the
earlier experiment. However, the Defense Attorney's Fallacy seemed to
dominate. Over 50 percent of the subjects made judgments of probable guilt
consistent with the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, giving no weight to evidence
of a match on a characteristic found in 1 percent of the population,' 2 9 but
only 4 percent made judgments consistent with the Prosecutor's Fallacy.' 30
Overall, these findings suggest that people have difficulty detecting
fallacious arguments-especially the argument favoring the Defense
Attorney's Fallacy-and that these arguments can lead significant numbers of
people to make judgments consistent with fallacious reasoning. In other
words, it is easy to talk people into using inappropriate judgmental strategies
to evaluate "indirectly relevant" base rate evidence presented in conjunction
with forensic evidence.
With the exception of individuals who fall victim to the Prosecutor's
Fallacy, however, most subjects in these studies appeared to give less weight
to evidence of a match than Bayes' theorem says they should. A consistent
finding, observed in six experiments, 13 1 is that subjects, on average, revise
judgments of probability of guilt upward by a smaller amount than that
required by Bayesian norms. In the first study by Thompson and Schumann,
for example, subjects' initial judgments of probability of guilt averaged about
25 percent.' 3 2 According to Bayes' theorem, after learning of a match on a
characteristic found in 2 percent of the population, subjects' final judgments
should have been about 93 percent. 33 However, subjects' actual judgments
averaged only 63 percent, 134 indicating that, on average, they gave the
evidence of the match less weight than they should have. This result is typical
of findings in other studies.13 5
Researchers in this area sometimes warn that their findings should be
viewed as preliminary.' 36 Many of the studies are rather rudimentary
simulations of trials in which subjects read summaries of evidence rather than
see actual testimony. In addition, the subjects make individual judgments
instead of deliberating as a group. Subjects are often asked to judge
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 178-79.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 9; Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9, at 176, 180,
experiments 1, 2; J. Goodman, supra note 9, studies 1, 2; Schumann & Thompson, supra note 9.
132. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9, at 174.
133. Id. at 175.
134. Id.
135. Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 9; J. Goodman, supra note 9, at 30.
136. See, e.g., Thompson & Schumann, supra note 9, at 183.
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probability of guilt rather than to decide whether to convict or acquit, hence
some concerns have been expressed about whether findings of such studies
"[go] beyond the articulation of numbers and actually [influence] the sorts of
decisions juries are called upon to make."' ' 7
Recently, however, researchers have begun conducting more realistic
studies. For example, Schumann and Thompson 38 recently examined the
effects of fallacious statistical arguments in the context of a highly realistic
simulated trial. Subjects in the role of jurors viewed a four-hour videotape of
a simulated trial based on transcripts of an actual California murder case.
Although some of the testimony was abbreviated or replaced with
stipulations, the simulated trial included virtually all of the evidence
presented in the case on which it was based. The attorneys in the simulated
trial were, in fact, experienced criminal lawyers, and the judge was a real
judge who gave legally appropriate instructions.
The case involved a robbery and murder in which the perpetrator was
injured, leaving blood at the scene. Although a considerable amount of
circumstantial evidence was presented, the case against the defendant was
weak except for a key piece of forensic evidence-genetic markers in his blood
matched those of the blood at the scene, and the relevant markers are found
in only 2 percent of the population.
Five different versions of the trial were shown to 116 simulated jurors.
Some jurors heard the prosecutor make an argument advocating the
Prosecutor's Fallacy, while others heard the prosecutor state only the
frequency of the genetic markers. Within each of those two groups, half of
the subjects heard the defense attorney make an argument for the Defense
Attorney's Fallacy and half did not. Thus one group heard competing
fallacious arguments, a second group heard no fallacious arguments, a third
group heard just the argument for the Prosecutor's Fallacy, and a fourth
heard just the argument for the Defense Attorney's Fallacy. The fifth group
was a control condition in which evidence of the matching blood types and the
accompanying statistical evidence were not presented. The arguments lasted
less than one minute in the context of a ten- to fifteen-minute closing
argument in a four-hour trial.
After watching the trial, the simulated jurors individually indicated
whether they would vote guilty or not guilty and estimated the probability that
the defendant actually committed the crime. Then they deliberated in groups
of six for up to an hour before again indicating their choice of verdict and
estimate of probability of guilt.
Before deliberation, half of the jurors voted guilty although no significant
differences were found among the five conditions.' 39 In other words, the
evidence of the matching blood markers appeared to have no effect,
regardless of how it was argued. Effects of the arguments emerged after
137. Id. at 183.
138. Schumann & Thompson, supra note 9.
139. Id. at 5.
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deliberation, however. The conviction rate and estimates of probability of
guilt dropped significantly in all conditions except the condition where jurors
heard only the argument for the Prosecutor's Fallacy.' 40 In that condition,
the conviction rate increased to 70 percent and average estimates of
probability of guilt increased to 85 percent, while in the other conditions, the
conviction rate ranged from 17 percent to 30 percent and average estimates
of probability of guilt ranged from 51 to 59 percent. 14' The short argument
for the Prosecutor's Fallacy thus had a powerful effect on jurors' ultimate
verdicts, but only where it was not countered by the argument for the Defense
Attorney's Fallacy. Jurors who heard arguments for both fallacies, for the
Defense Attorney's Fallacy only, or for neither fallacy produced conviction
rates and estimates of probability of guilt that did not differ significantly from
one another and that were only slightly higher than those in the control
condition. 14 2
These findings suggest that an argument for the Prosecutor's Fallacy can
be influential, even in the context of a highly realistic trial, if not countered by
the defense. Overall, however, these findings offer little support for those
who are concerned that jurors will give too much weight to statistical
evidence. Although the simulated jurors gave some weight to the evidence of
matching blood types-estimates of probability of guilt were significantly
higher where that evidence was presented than in the control group-the
difference between the control group and the conditions where the blood
typing evidence was presented were not as great as a Bayesian analysis
indicates they should have been. As in the previous studies, mock jurors
appear generally to undervalue rather than overvalue this evidence. Indeed,
subjects appeared to come closest to giving the evidence its correct value only
in response to the uncountered argument for the Prosecutor's Fallacy. This
finding raises an intriguing issue. How should the legal system respond if it
turns out that the only way to induce jurors to give the proper weight to such
evidence is to trick them with fallacious statistical arguments?
B. Sensitivity to Variations in Statistical Evidence
A second major concern that has been raised about the use of statistical
evidence is that jurors may be insensitive to variations in important statistical
values. 143 Jurors' sensitivity to statistical variation is an important issue
because, under some circumstances, variations that may seem relatively minor
in the frequency of a matching characteristic or the false-positive rate of the
140. Id. at 5-6.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5-10. If we take judgments of probability of guilt in the control condition as a prior
probability and revise them in light of the forensic evidence in the Bayesian manner, we find the final
judgments of probability of guilt should, on average, be above .90. Subjects' actual judgments were
not that high in any condition, although those in the Prosecutor's Fallacy-only condition were close.
143. Thompson, Britton & Schumann. supra note 9, at 2.
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test showing the match can have a large effect on the probative value of the
evidence. 144
Suppose, for example, that a juror initially estimates the probability of the
defendant's guilt to be only 10 percent, but then receives new, independent
evidence indicating that the defendant and perpetrator have the same blood
type. If the incidence rate of the blood type and the false-positive rate of the
test showing the match are both 1 percent, then, according to the Bayesian
model, the juror should revise the estimate of probability of guilt upward to
about .85 percent. If the incidence rate and false-positive rate are both, 5
percent, however, the Bayesian model indicates the juror's revised estimate
of probability of guilt should be only .53. Although the difference between 1
percent and 5 percent may appear small, it has a dramatic impact on the
probative value of the match between the defendant and perpetrator. 45
To evaluate the results of a forensic test linking the defendant to the crime
in cases where the test is less than perfectly reliable, jurors must evaluate two
factors: the possibility that the test result showing a match is a false-positive,
and the possibility that the match, if correct, is merely coincidental. Experts
on human judgment have suggested that when faced with problems such as
this involving two sources of uncertainty, people often proceed in a stepwise
fashion, following what has become known as the "best guess" strategy.
146
To reduce the complexity of the judgment, people make their best guess as to
whether the evidence is reliable and, if they think it is probably reliable, they
proceed to evaluate the evidence as if it were perfectly reliable. They then
discount their certainty about their conclusions to take into account their
uncertainty about the reliability of the evidence. They often fail to discount
this evidence adequately, however. The result is that judgments based on less
than fully reliable evidence are often unduly extreme because of the failure to
discount adequately for unreliable evidence.' 47 If this process influences
jurors' evaluations of forensic matching evidence, it could cause jurors to be
insensitive to variations in the reliability of the evidence.
The sensitivity to variations in the statistics accompanying forensic
matching evidence was examined directly in a series of studies reported by
Thompson, Britton, and Schumann.' 48  In the standard experimental
paradigm, mock jurors were asked to evaluate evidence of a match between
the suspect and the perpetrator on a rare blood type. The rarity of the blood
type and the false-positive rate of the forensic test were both experimentally
varied to be either 1 or 5 percent. In the first study, undergraduate mock
144. The way a juror should respond to forensic evidence involving frequency statistics and false-
positive rates may be specified by a mathematical model based on Bayes' theorem. Id. at Appendix.
Thompson, Britton, and Schumann derived this model and used it as a benchmark against which to
compare actual judgments based on such data.
145. Id. at 7.
146. See, e.g., Gettys, Kelly & Peterson, The Best-Guess Hypothesis in ,Wultistage Inference, 10 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 364 (1973); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Disorder Theor',
28 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1977).
147. Gettys, Kelly & Peterson, supra note 146.
148. Thompson, Britton & Schumann, supra note 9.
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jurors were given several hypothetical cases at once in which the frequency
and false-positive rate varied. These subjects were able to evaluate accurately
the relative strength of the evidence. In other words, they could tell that the
evidence was strongest where the frequency and false-positive rate were low,
weakest where the frequency and false-positive rate were high, and of
intermediate value where one factor was high and the other low. In the
second study, however, subjects were given only one piece of forensic
evidence to evaluate and the frequency and false-positive rate statistics were
experimentally varied among different groups of subjects. 149
Although the statistical variation should have made a large difference in
the value of the evidence, the different groups of subjects did not differ
significantly in the value they assigned to it.150 The group that received the
strongest evidence (low frequency, low false-positive rate) did not give the
evidence more weight than the group that received the weakest evidence (high
frequency, high false-positive rate). It thus appears that people can rank in
order several pieces of evidence according to relative strength but have
difficulty evaluating the absolute strength of any single piece of evidence.' 5'
Actual trials are, of course, more analogous to the second experiment than
the first, because jurors are called upon to evaluate absolute strength of
forensic matching evidence rather than the relative strength of several pieces
of evidence.
In a third experiment, Thompson, Britton, and Schumann tested mock
jurors sensitivity to these statistical variations in a more realistic study which
included group deliberation. 152 Again they found that mock jurors did not
differentiate weak from strong evidence. The hypothetical case was devised in
such a way that Bayesian predictions of probability of guilt were 64 percent in
the strong evidence condition, where forensic tests had a low false-positive
rate and found a match on a rare characteristic, but only 22 percent in the
weak evidence condition, where forensic tests had a higher false-positive rate
and found a match on a more common characteristic. 153 The conviction rate
of subjects in the two conditions did not significantly differ, however, and was
actually a bit higher in the weak evidence condition (84 percent) than in the
strong evidence condition (78 percent). 154 Following deliberation, subjects in
both conditions estimated the probability of the defendant's guilt. Among
subjects in the strong evidence condition the average estimate was 66
percent, which is very close to Bayesian norms. Among subjects in the weak
evidence condition, however, the average estimate was 65 percent, which is
much higher than the Bayesian prediction of 22 percent, indicating that
149. Id. at 7-10.
150. Id. at 10-19.
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id. at 12-13.
153. Id. at 15-20.
154. Id. at 17.
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subjects' failure to differentiate weak and strong statistical evidence led them
to overestimate the value of weak evidence in this instance.' 55
More research is needed in this area to test the generality of these
provocative but rather preliminary findings. These studies suggest, however,
that under some circumstances jurors may seriously overestimate the value of
statistical evidence, as Tribe and the Minnesota Supreme Court feared. The
reason for this problem, however, is not jurors' tendency to confuse the
frequency of a matching characteristic with the probability of innocence, but
their tendency to give equal weight to statistical evidence that varies widely in
its probative value.
Recommendations for dealing with this problem may be a bit premature.
Until the scope of the problem is better understood, attempted solutions
might easily miss the mark. If these preliminary findings are borne out by
further research, however, one possible solution would be for the courts to be
especially cautious about admitting forensic evidence of questionable
reliability. Forensic matching evidence that is relatively weak, by virtue of
having a high false-positive rate, might be particularly likely to be overvalued.
C. Dealing With Partially Redundant Evidence
A third problem concerns subjects' reactions to partially redundant
evidence, that is, evidence that partly overlaps and recapitulates facts they
have already taken into account. 156 Forensic evidence showing a match
between the suspect and perpetrator is partially redundant in cases where the
suspect was selected in a manner that renders him more likely than most
people to match the perpetrator on a certain characteristic. In the Carlson
case 157 discussed earlier, for example, the defendant's hair matched, in a
number of separate qualities, a hair taken from the perpetrator. Assuming the
defendant was arrested in part because his hair matched the perpetrator's
with regard to color and length, the evidence of a match on all qualities is
partly redundant with what is already known.
The inferential complexities created by partial redundancy among
multiple items of evidence have been discussed by philosophers of inductive
logic,' 58 legal evidence scholars,159 and Bayesian theorists. 160 A variety of
terms have been used to describe partially redundant evidence. The terms
"cumulative" and "corroborative" are preferred by most legal scholars, but
those terms will be avoided here because, as Schum notes, the precise
155. Id. at 17-19, 25.
156. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
157. State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978).
158. J. VENN, THE PRINCIPLES OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC (2d ed. 1905); S. TOULMIN, THE USES OF
ARGUMENT (1964).
159. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OFJUDICIAL PROOF (1937); Lempert, Mlodeling Relevance, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1021 (1977).
160. Most notably, D. Schum, On Factors which Influence the Redundancy of Cumulative and
Corroborative Testimonial Evidence (1979) (Technical Report #79-02). See also Schum & Martin,
supra note 80.
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meaning varies so much among different scholars that their use promotes
more confusion than clarity.' 6 ' A precise account of the ways in which
evidence may be partially redundant requires an appreciation of the catenated
or "cascaded" nature of inductive inference. 62 Accordingly, the best
accounts of partially redundant evidence are provided by Wigmore, who uses
complex evidentiary diagrams to show connections among various pieces of
evidence, 163 and Schum, who uses formal mathematical models of cascaded
inference derived from Bayes' theorem. 164 Lempert also provides a clear,
though less complete, account of partial redundancy using Bayesian
models. 165
Although considerable attention has been paid to formal descriptions of
partial redundancy in evidence, relatively little is known about people's ability
to apprehend and deal appropriately with this evidentiary subtlety when
evaluating the evidence in criminal trials. The only empirical study that sheds
light on this question was reported by Schum and Martin. 166 In this complex
and sophisticated study, subjects evaluated evidence in hypothetical criminal
cases in three different but formally equivalent ways. In some instances,
subjects evaluated the evidence in the entire case "holistically;" in other
instances the evidence was either partially or totally "decomposed," and
subjects made separate evaluations of its constituent elements. Subjects were
trained to evaluate the evidence by estimating likelihood ratios and
conditional probabilities and they evaluated the evidence in these terms. The
major finding of relevance here is that subjects' evaluations were more
sensitive to partial redundancies among items of evidence when the evidence
was decomposed than when evaluations were "holistic."' 167 This finding
raises the possibility that people may be inadequately sensitive to partial
redundancy when, as in actual criminal trials, they are evaluating evidence
that is not explicitly "decomposed" for them.
Some additional light has been cast on the problem by a study reported by
Thompson, Meeker, and Britton.168 Undergraduate subjects were asked to
read written descriptions of evidence in a series of criminal cases. For each
case, the description provided an account of the nature of the crime and the
manner in which the suspect was identified. It then described two
hypothetical pieces of forensic evidence that might be offered against the
suspect. Subjects were asked to judge which of the two pieces of evidence
would constitute stronger evidence of the suspect's guilt. Each piece of
evidence revealed a match between the suspect and the perpetrator in a
different but equally rare characteristic. One piece of evidence was partially
161. Schum & Martin, supra note 80, at 117.
162. Id. at 116-18.
163. J. WIGMORE, supra note 159, at 154.
164. Schum, supra note 160. See also Schum & Martin, supra note 80.
165. Lempert, supra note 80. See also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 80, at 148-53.
166. Schum & Martin, supra note 80.
167. Id.
168. Thompson, Meeker & Britton, supra note 9.
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redundant because the suspect had been selected in a way that rendered him
unusually likely to have that matching characteristic even if innocent. The
other piece of evidence was not redundant because the suspect was no more
likely than anyone else to have it if he was innocent. For example, one case
involved the burglary of a drug store by a black perpetrator who was injured,
leaving blood at the scene. The police identified a suspect based, in part, on
the fact that he was black. Subjects were then asked which of two pieces of
evidence would be stronger: (1) evidence that the suspect and perpetrator
both have sickle-cell characteristic, a trait found in about one person in 100 in
the United States, but most commonly found among blacks and rarely found
in other races, or (2) evidence that the suspect and perpetrator both have a
hypothetical genetic characteristic (factor Q), which is found in one person in
100 in the United States but is evenly distributed among the races. The match
on factor Q is clearly stronger evidence against the suspect because he was
identified based in part on a characteristic (his race) that renders him more
likely than the general population to have sickle-cell trait if innocent.
The goal of the study was simply to test whether people realize that the
partially redundant piece of evidence deserved less weight than the
nonredundant evidence. In general, it appears that they do not.' 69 In most of
the hypothetical cases, about a third of subjects thought the partially
redundant evidence was stronger, about a third thought the two pieces of
evidence were equally strong, and a third thought (correctly) that the
nonredundant evidence was stronger. This distribution of responses is what
would be expected if people could not detect any difference between the
partially redundant and nonredundant evidence and simply responded at
random. People's ability to appreciate the distinction appears to improve
following discussion of the issue with others. Even after discussing the issue
for up to twenty minutes with others, however, approximately half of the
subjects still chose the incorrect option when asked which piece of evidence
was stronger. 70
Although these findings are preliminary, they raise serious concerns about
the ability of jurors to detect partial redundancies in forensic evidence and to
take those into account. As a result, jurors may overvalue forensic matching
evidence in cases in which it is partially redundant with other evidence.
IV
CONCLUSION
Empirical research on peoples' evaluation of statistical evidence, although
preliminary and full of gaps, is beginning to define the strengths and
weaknesses of lay statistical reasoning in ways that should prove helpful to the
legal system. This research casts some much-needed light on a number of
issues that have divided commentators and troubled appellate courts.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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However, it appears that the broad question posed by this article has no single
or simple answer.
The research should allay fears that jurors will overvalue statistical
evidence by mistakenly equating the frequency of matching characteristics
with the probability of innocence. Although some jurors do fall victim to this
type of fallacious reasoning, they are a small minority in all studies and the
prevailing tendency is toward undervaluing rather than overvaluing such
evidence. Arguments for the Prosecutor's Fallacy can have a powerful
influence on judgments of guilt, but can be countered effectively by opposing
arguments.
Jurors may sometimes overvalue forensic evidence used to link a
defendant to a crime, but this potential problem arises not from the
Prosecutor's Fallacy but from people's failure to take into account the
unreliability and partial redundancy of forensic evidence. Where the value of
forensic matching evidence is significantly undermined by the high false-
positive rate of a forensic test, and where the defendant was selected in a
manner that renders him more likely to possess the matching characteristics
than the general population, there appears to be a significant danger that the
forensic evidence will be overvalued. Until these judgmental tendencies are
better understood, courts would be well advised to use caution when
considering the admissibility of statistics in connection with such evidence.
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